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Federal court strikes down Nebraska 
corporate farming law*
by Roger McEowen, associate professor of agricultural law, (515) 294-4076, 
mceowen@iastate.edu and Neil E. Harl, Charles F. Curtiss Distinguished Pro-
fessor in Agriculture and Emeritus Professor of Economics, Iowa State Univer-
sity, Ames, Iowa. Member of the Iowa Bar, harl@iastate.edu
In late 2005, the Federal District Court for the District of Nebraska held, in Jones, et 
al.  v. Gale, et al., that the Ne-
braska Constitutional provision 
restricting unauthorized corporate 
involvement in certain types of 
agricultural activities is unconsti-
tutional on “dormant commerce 
clause” grounds and on the basis 
that the provision violates the 
Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA). The Nebraska Attorney 
General is appealing the ruling to 
the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Eighth Circuit, which 
has ruled twice on anti-corpo-
rate farming restrictions in other 
states in recent years. The case 
represents the most recent judicial 
pronouncement concerning the 
ability of a particular state’s citi-
zenry to shape the future structure 
of agriculture within that state.
Overview - Anti-Corporate 
Farming Restrictions. 
Presently, nine states prohibit 
corporations from engaging in 
agriculture to various degrees. 
The restrictions grew out of rising 
concern across the country that 
several key sectors of the U.S. 
economy were becoming con-
trolled by a few large firms and 
multi-state corporations. While 
the laws are not designed to slow 
down or prevent structural change 
in agriculture, they are designed 
to control the organizational form 
of farming operations based on 
ownership arrangements. Until 
recently, no appellate-level court 
at either the state or federal levels 
had ever held a state anti-corpo-
rate farming law unconstitutional.
Initiative 300. 
The Nebraska anti-corporate 
farming law (I-300) was added 
to the state Constitution in 1982 
by voters through the initiative 
and referendum process. The law 
2	 	 	 	 	      March 2006
Federal court strikes down Nebraska corporate farming law, continued from page 1
continued on page 3
prohibits a corporation or syndicate from acquiring 
or obtaining an interest in any title to real estate used 
for farming or ranching in Nebraska, or from engag-
ing in farming or ranching in the state.  A syndicate 
is defined as a limited partnership other than a 
limited partnership in which the partners are mem-
bers of a family or a trust created for the benefit of a 
member of the family, related to one another within 
the fourth degree of kindred (first cousins) or their 
spouses, at least one of whom is a person residing 
on or actively engaged in the day-to-day labor and 
management of the farm or ranch. Numerous excep-
tions exist, but the major one is for family farm or 
ranch corporations (defined as a majority of the vot-
ing stock held by members of the family) or a trust 
created for the benefit of a member of the family. The 
majority shareholders must be related to each other 
within the fourth degree of kindred (or be the spouse 
of a family member), and at least one family member 
must either reside on the farm or be actively engaged 
in the day-to-day labor and management of the farm.
Jones, et al. v. Gale, et al. 
The plaintiffs were engaged in agricultural activi-
ties to a certain degree. They all claimed that I-300 
barred their proposed activities and challenged the 
law on the basis that it violated the “dormant com-
merce clause,” the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
and the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. Two of the plaintiffs were disabled and claimed 
that I-300 also violated the ADA because of the 
requirement that at least one family member be “a 
person residing on or actively engaged in the day to 
day labor and management of the farm or ranch.”
The “Dormant Commerce Clause.” 
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution 
forbids discrimination against commerce, which 
repeatedly has been held to mean that state and 
localities may not discriminate against the transac-
tions of out-of-state actors in interstate markets even 
when the Congress has not legislated on the subject. 
The overriding rationale of the commerce clause was 
to create and foster the development of a common 
market among the states and to eradicate internal 
trade barriers. Thus, a state may not enact rules or 
regulations requiring out-of–state commerce to be 
conducted according to the enacting state’s terms. So, 
states have the power to regulate economic activity 
within their borders, but cannot do so in a discrimi-
natory manner. If the state has been motivated by a 
discriminatory purpose, the state bears the burden 
to show that it is pursuing a legitimate purpose that 
cannot be achieved with a nondiscriminatory al-
ternative. However, if the state regulates without a 
discriminatory purpose but with a legitimate pur-
pose, the provision will be upheld unless the burden 
on interstate commerce is clearly excessive in relation 
to the benefits that the state derives from the regula-
tion. In essence, a state is free to regulate economic 
transactions occurring within its borders in the man-
ner it deems appropriate as long as it is done in a 
nondiscriminatory fashion, but is not free to regulate 
economic conduct occurring elsewhere.
The court’s “dormant commerce clause” 
analysis. 
The court held that I-300 was facially discriminatory 
because it “was conceived and born in protectionist 
fervor,” and that the ballot title and language of I-300 
clearly indicated that Nebraskans would be given 
“favored treatment” on the basis that it would be 
more economically feasible for those living in close 
proximity to Nebraska farm and ranches to provide 
“day-to-day physical labor and management.” As 
such, the court continued down the path established 
by the Eighth Circuit in two earlier cases involving 
anti-corporate farming laws from South Dakota and 
Iowa, where the court did not examine the actual 
impact on economic conduct by in-state and out-of-
state firms, instead relying on statements of legisla-
tors and ballot titles to find discrimination against 
interstate commerce. But, the court appeared to go 
even further when it stated, “When it is apparent 
from the language of a …state constitutional amend-
ment…that its effect is to burden out-of state eco-
nomic interests and benefit in-state economic inter-
ests, the party challenging it should not be required 
to bear the burden of an evidentiary hearing to prove 
the obvious” [emphasis added]. Unfortunately, the 
court did not provide any explanation as to how the 
text of I-300, by itself, can have a discriminatory 
impact on interstate commerce. While the court was 
correct to examine the text of I-300, the text clearly 
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applies to any corporation or syndicate “organized 
under the laws of any state of the United States.” The 
provision does not provide preferential treatment for 
Nebraska firms as compared to out-of-state firms. All 
firms wishing to engage in agricultural activities in 
Nebraska are subject to an identical set of rules, as 
far as I-300 is concerned. Consequently, an appro-
priate question is whether I-300 burdens interstate 
commerce excessively in relation to the benefits that 
the state derives from I-300. That is not likely to 
be the case, particularly since I-300 does not con-
tain any prohibition against agricultural contracting 
activities. 
The court also found a discriminatory effect associ-
ated with the requirement that a family member pro-
vide (as the court referred to it) “day-to-day physical 
labor and management.” The actual language of 
I-300 requires that a family member of a qualified 
entity be a “person residing on or actively engaged 
in the day-to-day labor and management of the farm 
or ranch…” The test is one of active engagement and 
not, as the court put it, the provision of “day-to-day 
physical labor and management.” While the court 
relied on Hall v. Progress Pig, Inc., for its reasoning, 
that case involved the construction of the terms “la-
bor” and “management” and did not directly address 
the question of the meaning of “active engagement” 
in the context of the provision of labor and manage-
ment. There is authority for the notion that “active 
engagement” requires much less than actually ren-
dering labor and management on the premises.  For 
example, under USDA payment limitation rules, one 
of the requirements that a farmer (or otherwise eligi-
ble entity) must satisfy to be eligible for federal farm 
program payments is the active engagement test. As 
part of the active engagement test, the individual (or 
entity) must make a significant contribution of active 
personal labor or active personal management (or a 
combination thereof). While hired services do not 
count, it is clear that active personal management 
need not be performed on the farm to satisfy the test 
– a person can contribute active personal manage-
ment while living in a distant town. Active engage-
ment in labor activities can be achieved via contract. 
In any event, under I-300, the mere fact that the 
shareholder resides on the farm negates the require-
ment that the shareholder be actively engaged in the 
day to day labor and management of the farm.
The ADA Claim. 
The Court also found that I-300 was invalid un-
der the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause because 
it conflicted with the ADA on the basis that two of 
the plaintiffs were disabled and could not perform 
the daily physical labor that the court believed 
I-300 required. The ADA provides that “no quali-
fied individual with a disability shall, by reason of 
such disability, be excluded from participation in or 
be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or 
activities of a public entity, or be discriminated by 
any such entity.” While the court noted that “public 
entity” has been construed broadly to apply to all 
actions of state and local governments, the court did 
not address the point that I-300 did not involve the 
action of a governmental body. Instead, I-300 was 
the result of the initiative and referendum process 
and was approved by Nebraska voters. No action 
or activity of government was involved. The court 
also did not address the applicability of the ADA to 
Nebraska farming operations. The ADA only applies 
to “employers” that have 15 or more employees for 
each working day in each of 20 or more calendar 
weeks in the current or preceding calendar year. 
Conclusion. 
The court’s opinion appears to be seriously flawed in 
several respects. However, it is questionable whether 
the opinion will be reversed on appeal. Except for 
its opinion in Hampton, the Eighth Circuit has not 
shown much willingness to analyze deeply the dor-
mant commerce clause issue. If the decision stands, 
it will have a dampening effect on a state’s efforts to 
ensure competitive markets for agricultural products 
and a level playing field for independent agricul-
tural producers. Increased pressure could also be 
placed on the Congress to address the anti-competi-
tive effects of concentrated agricultural markets and 
vertically integrated agricultural production supply 
chains.
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* Reprinted with permission from the January 6, 2006 issue of 
Agricultural Law Digest, Agricultural Law Press Publications, 
Eugene, Oregon. Footnotes not included.
